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I. INTRODUCTION 
United States Supreme Court decisions are like pebbles thrown 
in the jurisprudential pond, creating ripples throughout the 
American body of law. A study of the ripples from a single decision 
pebble yields unique insight into the true impacts of a particular 
finding, especially when enough time has passed to make reflection 
on the size and scope of the ripples meaningful. And such an 
analysis will reveal discrepancies between any hypothesized ripple 
effects found in post-decision literature and the actual impacts later 
observed. This Comment examines those phenomena using the 
2015 Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert1 as a case 
study to compare the repercussions of the holding, as reflected in its 
subsequent application by state and federal courts, to the impacts 
predicted by scholars at the time of its resolution. Utilizing the First 
Amendment,2 the Reed decision held a municipal sign ordinance, 
which differentiated the treatment of signs based on category and 
type, to be content-based on its face.3 The Court applied strict 
scrutiny, without consideration of the governmental intent that had 
been often used by lower courts in defense of content-neutrality,4 
and found the sign ordinance unconstitutional.5  
 
 1 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3 135 S. Ct. at 2224. 
 4 Richard Wolf, What the First Amendment protects—and what it doesn’t, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 6, 2018, 2:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/04/06/what-first-
amendment-protects-and-what-doesnt/469920002/ [http://perma.cc/7Q9Y-LN9K] (“The First 
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Supreme Court decisions such as Reed are analogized herein 
to pebbles cast into a pond. Ofttimes, the mass of the pebble is 
not fully understood before it is launched; but the ripples it 
produces can be easily observed and analyzed, given sufficient 
time. This Comment posits that characteristics of the pebble 
itself are often less consequential¾it is the reach of the ripples 
created that matters. But before the ripples can be meaningfully 
examined, an adequate amount of time must pass to allow the 
pebble’s impact to propagate throughout the legal pond. Then, an 
analysis of the actual ripples produced can be compared to the 
results predicted at the time the pebble was tossed. 
Not all United States Supreme Court decisions seem 
momentous. Although some decisions may be highly 
anticipated¾where anticipation may sometimes be directly 
proportional to media coverage¾the Court’s judgments that 
resolve circuit splits or clarify nuances of specific laws are some 
of the routine functions of our highest Court of the land.6 
Because they operate as the final say, Supreme Court opinions 
are ofttimes the subject of academic ponderings and predictions 
in literature. Occasionally, however, these jurisprudential 
prophecies may fail to materialize.  
A richer understanding of the true impacts of Supreme Court 
cases can sometimes be derived by assessing their significance after a 
sufficient passage of time. It is recognized that, for most cases, a 
majority of academic and popular commentary frequently occurs 
within a few years of a decision, and by its very nature, such 
commentary is incapable of assessing any long-term effects. Often the 
body of initial literature is not reexamined at a later point in time. 
That is, very few analyses have examined the track record of a 
decision to determine its more global effects over time. This 
Comment aims to be different. It investigates the advantages of 
reflecting on lower courts’ treatment and implementation of the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning, and it compares the actual treatment of 
the opinion with the initial commentary, using Reed as an example. 
This type of exercise can result in confirmation or contradiction. On 
the one hand, it may sometimes disprove less-evidenced earlier 
predictions. If the reality of subsequent applications has not mirrored 
initial prognostications, over-reliance on the body of predictive 
literature without such reflection has the risk of skewing our 
perception of a decision’s true impact. On the other hand, if applying 
 
Amendment is a mere 45 words. But it’s still giving lawmakers and judges fits 227 years 
after its adoption.”). 
 5 135 S. Ct. at 2224. 
 6 See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3507 
(3d ed. 2019). 
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this method shows results consistent with earlier predictions, it 
provides validation through its testing. At the very least, we should 
embrace such an inquiry to create a more robust understanding of a 
decision’s place within our American jurisprudence. 
This Comment adds to the body of literature on the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 Reed decision by exploring how courts at all levels 
have applied and incorporated Reed. Part I develops the analogy 
of Supreme Court decisions to pebbles pitched into the 
jurisprudential pond, and looks at exemplar cases at each end of 
the ripple spectrum to get a sense of the analytical frame used in 
this Comment. Part I also discusses the importance of allowing a 
sufficient amount of time to pass for examination to be 
meaningful. Part II chronicles the rise of Reed and its journey to 
the Supreme Court, and it postulates that Reed is an ideal test 
case to analyze. Part III reviews the post-Reed literature, noting 
particularly a variety of predictions forecasting Reed’s impact. 
This part paints the backdrop against which the true Supreme 
Court decision effects will be compared. Part IV presents a 
comprehensive assessment of Reed’s application in state and 
federal courts. Comparisons among jurisdictions are given, as well 
as topical analyses of holdings citing and relying upon the Reed 
decision. Part V summarizes the Reed application results and 
offers reflections on when similar United States Supreme Court 
decisions should be examined. In conclusion, although certain 
areas of First Amendment law have undoubtedly been influenced 
by Reed, it does not appear that the predicted far-reaching impacts 
of Reed have materialized.  
This Comment posits that a robust impact analysis of a 
United States Supreme Court decision is best accomplished after 
allowing for an adequate passage of time. Such a study controls 
against two potential risks. First, without giving these decisions 
time to inversely percolate¾a phrase used herein to denote the 
application of Supreme Court precedent by the lower 
courts¾predictive literature runs the risk of misleading legal 
practitioners, as well as the general public. Specifically, 
advertised assumptions about anticipated aftermath may never 
actualize. Second, to understand the true impacts of a singular 
Supreme Court ruling, a conscious research effort evaluating the 
lower courts’ implementation is required, and will either validate 
or repudiate any hypothesized applications. Absent such a study, 
unsubstantiated conjectures in the literature may come to be 
accepted as valid truisms, thus undermining, rather than 
enhancing, the body of legal analysis surrounding a particular 
case like Reed.  
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II. THE PEBBLES AND THE POND 
The smooth surface of the American legal pond is regularly 
disrupted by United States Supreme Court decision pebbles.7 
Even the lightest of these pebbles will produce a ripple. And 
although the true mass of the pebble may not be known or clearly 
understood at the time it is tossed, the resulting ripples observed 
in the jurisprudence are of particular interest.  
A. Supreme Court Cases as Pebbles 
Case law forms through judicial proceedings. The decisions 
handed down by the courts form precedent¾an essential, 
dynamic part of our American legal system.8 It is no wonder then 
that when a case is granted certiorari and comes before the 
United States Supreme Court, curiosity is piqued throughout the 
legal community to see if the Court’s ruling will hold to an 
established norm or offer valid expostulation to alter a judicial 
rudder.9 The Court’s decisions may naturally result in ripples10 
that are unpredictable in scope. Seemingly mundane findings 
that are passed down without fanfare may produce lasting legal 
effects.11 And seemingly major holdings that produce immediate 
uproar among legal scholars and/or the general public may turn 
out to have limited future impact.12 It is nigh impossible to 
accurately predict the exact impacts that will arise from a single 
 
 7 For example, the October 2018 term has heard sixty-nine cases argued. See 
Statistics, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/ [http://perma.cc/69MH-
UKJT] (last visited May 14, 2019). 
 8 WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 288 (Roger W. 
Cooley & Charles Lesley James eds., 3d ed. 1914) (“In law a precedent is an adjudged case or 
decision of a court of justice, considered as furnishing a rule or authority for the determination 
of an identical or similar case afterwards arising, or of a similar question of law.”). 
 9 See Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 
710–17 (2018), for a history of the development of the modern certiorari process. 
 10 Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming 
Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 499, 556 n.271 (1997) 
(“Supreme Court opinions obviously have a powerful ripple effect throughout the entire 
legal system. Particularly when, as I suggest, the Court seems intent on changing the 
direction of a particular constitutional trend, even the tone and dicta in the opinions can 
have an enormously influential effect.”). See also George D. Brown, The Constitution as an 
Obstacle to Government Ethics–Reformist Legislation After National Treasury Employees 
Union, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 979, 1042 (1996) (noting most Supreme Court decisions 
have ripple effects). 
 11 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 12 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
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decision,13 for it may be that although “[t]he Court intended [one] 
result, . . . there have also been ripple effects it did not foresee.”14  
We should perhaps be cautious of repercussion forecasts. 
This is because predictive literature may be rendered moot over 
time if the impacts imagined fail to materialize. It may be 
prudent, therefore, to draw upon the benefits of a reflective 
analysis after sufficient time has passed in order to assess 
predictive counterparts. If a case is revisited after a few years, 
the true impact it has had on the legal system can be compared 
to the impacts predicted by the initial literature. Such an 
examination will produce a more robust understanding of the 
case as a whole, and may highlight disparities or consistencies 
between hypothesized and actual impacts. 
B. The Spectrum of Resulting Ripples 
The existence of Supreme Court decision impacts has long 
been recognized: “[F]ew Supreme Court decisions stand alone 
without ‘ripple effects’ beyond their immediate facts.”15 Since 
these ripples are part of our legal reality,16 a further examination 
is warranted and, indeed, prudent.17 The potential disconnect 
between predicted and actual Supreme Court decision 
repercussions can be demonstrated by examining the two ends of 
the spectrum—opinions announced without pomp but that had 
profound impacts, and cases decided amidst a great deal of 
attention but that resulted in negligible impacts.  
At one end of the spectrum are cases that passed through the 
Court quietly without ruffling any feathers or creating much stir in 
academia, but nonetheless have left a deep and lasting impression. 
One such case was Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,18 decided in June of 1984. In the year 
following, twenty-six law review articles cited the case; however, of 
 
 13 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. 
REV. 343, 375 (1993) (“[T]he promulgation of bold new rules, or the abandonment of old ones, 
can have ripple effects that the Supreme Court may not be well situated to anticipate.”). 
 14 James E. von der Heydt, Ripple Effects: The Unintended Change to Jurisdictional 
Pleading Standards After Iqbal, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 799, 801 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
 15 Brown, supra note 10, at 1042. See also Fallon, supra note 13, at 375 (noting 
ripple effects may be unanticipated). 
 16 Haney, supra note 10, at 556 (“Supreme Court opinions obviously have a powerful 
ripple effect throughout the entire legal system.”). 
 17 This seems especially true in our current society which appears to be developing 
an increased tendency to jump to conclusions without due consideration of the validity of 
underlying facts or analysis. See, e.g., Kim Hart, The snap decision society, AXIOS (Apr. 4, 
2019), http://www.axios.com/snap-decisions-society-jumping-to-conclusions-14bf251e-d51e-
4685-bcf9-9e948496353b.html [http://perma.cc/ZF6U-ZFZG]. 
 18 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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these, seventeen referred to the holding only in footnotes,19 four 
gave it no more than a passing mention,20 and one simply 
compared it to prior court findings.21 The six remaining articles 
voiced cautious opinions, hedged with words such as “may,” 
“perhaps,” “if,” and “suggests.”22 Chevron certainly did not seem 
to cause important legal reverberations at the time it was 
decided.23 But the resulting doctrine of “Chevron deference” is 
well-established and widely relied upon today.24 This “icon of 
administrative law”25 is an example of a case with little to no 
predicted impacts, but one that has had a large, long-lasting 
influence in reality. 
 
 19 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 385 n.27 (1985); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 596 n.250 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 26 n.114 (1985). 
 20 James E. Alexander, Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility 
District, 15 ENVTL. L. 325, 336 (1985); Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for 
Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 306–07 
(1985); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1242–43 (1985); Andrew Joseph Siegel, The U.S.–Japanese Whaling 
Accord: A Result of the Discretionary Loophole in the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 19 
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 577, 600 (1985). 
 21 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
549–53 (1985). 
 22 The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 247, 247 (1984) (“[T]he Court’s 
opinion last Term in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
which upheld EPA regulations on air pollution as a reasonable exercise of administrative 
discretion, suggests that courts have a very limited role in reviewing agency 
decisions . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative 
Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 225 (1984) (“This approach, if adhered to by the Court, will 
maximize agency discretion.”); Jack L. Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court 
Declines to Burst EPA’s Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL. L. 285, 287–88 (1985) (“The United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, may signal 
an end to this hostile regulatory climate.”) (footnote omitted); Stephen M. Lynch, A 
Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency’s Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 470 (1985) (“In Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court may have forged the 
analytic framework for assessing the validity of an administrative agency’s construction of 
the statute that it is charged with administering.”) (footnote omitted); Eric Redman, 
Statutory Construction in the Supreme Court: A Northwest Power Act Example, 15 
ENVTL. L. 353, 354 (1985) (“Thus, Chevron is perhaps more likely than ALCOA to have a 
lasting impact . . . .”). 
 23 Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 
66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 257 (2014) (“Most landmark decisions are born great—they are 
understood to be of special significance from the moment they are decided. But Chevron was 
little noticed when it was decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark case only some 
years later.”). See also FedSoc Films, Chevron: Accidental Landmark, FEDERALIST 
SOCIETY (Dec. 19, 2018), http://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/chevron-accidental-landmark 
[http://perma.cc/B68U-MNVQ] (discussing the origins of the Chevron doctrine and how it 
rose to become an “accidental landmark”).  
 24 See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579 (2006). 
 25 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 937, 938 (2018). 
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At the other end of the spectrum, there are cases that 
approached the Court with high-level publicity or political hype, 
and with great attention paid by the general public. For example, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.26 came before the Supreme 
Court in 2014 in the middle of a media storm.27 The case sought 
to answer whether a Christian-owned corporation which objected 
on religious grounds to the mandatory provision of post-conception 
contraceptives could be exempted from the requirement.28 While 
the press coverage was extensive, the actual ruling’s impact was 
minor: “Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores[,] . . . despite significant 
media attention, has virtually no current impact . . . .”29 This case 
seemed, at the time, destined to create a fire storm, but produced 
minor sparks in reality. These two cases together illustrate that 
unanticipated effects may subsequently emerge, or anticipated 
effects simply may not materialize. 
C. The Importance of Time 
Supreme Court decisions need time to unfold. Each one 
inevitably takes on a life of its own as it is fostered by the lower 
courts.30 Some remain in the background, simply adding to the 
broad base of authority on a particular subject. Some grow up to 
be seminal cases in their field, earning their place in hornbooks 
 
 26 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 27 See Jaime Fuller, Here’s what you need to know about the Hobby Lobby case, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/24/ 
heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-hobby-lobby-case/?utm_term=.c74ae27a7a4f 
[http://perma.cc/T7WP-XEL3]; Julia Mirabella & Sandhya Bathija, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius: 
Crafting a Dangerous Precedent, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 1, 2013, 9:08 AM), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2013/10/01/76033/hobby-lobby-v-
sebelius-crafting-a-dangerous-precedent/ [http://perma.cc/K9F5-N9HR].  
 28 573 U.S. at 688–90. 
 29 Matthew J. Schenck & Jennifer L. Berry, Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Decision: Little 
Immediate Impact on Employers, PAUL, PLEVIN, SULLIVAN & CONNAUGHTON LLP (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.paulplevin.com/blog/supreme-courts-ihobby-lobbyi-decision-little-immediate-impact-
on-employers [http://perma.cc/U7LE-NYUK]. See also Gregg Fisch, The Supreme Court’s 
Ruling in Hobby Lobby that Closely Held, For-Profit Companies Should Receive Religious 
Exemptions From ObamaCare’s Conception Mandate Likely Will Have Little Practical 
Impact Immediately in the Employment Arena, L. & EMP. L. BLOG (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2014/06/articles/discrimination/the-supreme-
courts-ruling-in-hobby-lobby-that-closely-held-for-profit-companies-should-receive-
religious-exemptions-from-obamacares-conception-mandate-likely-will-have-little-practi/ 
[http://perma.cc/45H3-788Y] (“[I]t is easy to understand why this case has touched such a 
political nerve and is causing such a heated response. In terms of practical effects in the 
employment arena, however, the immediate impact on employers and employees likely will be 
limited for the foreseeable future.”); Emma Green, The Supreme Court Isn’t Waging a War on 
Women in Hobby Lobby, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/ 
2014/06/hobby-lobby-isnt-waging-a-war-on-women/373717 [http://perma.cc/QC9A-WREE] 
(quoting the White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives director, John J. Dilulio Jr., as 
saying, “Love it or loathe it, the Hobby Lobby decision is limited in scope.”). 
 30 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 865–66 (1994). 
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across the land. This growth can be thought of as a type of 
percolation in reverse. The “concept of percolation” refers to the 
process by which “cases involving constitutional or statutory 
interpretation are generally granted certiorari only when they 
have been sufficiently vetted in the lower courts and have risen 
to the level of a dispute or split.”31 I will refer to this reverse type 
of percolation as “inverse percolation.” Just as the initial 
percolation is a beneficial element of our judicial system,32 there 
is also value in inverse percolation, whereby a Supreme Court 
decision becomes infused into the general jurisprudence via lower 
court application.  
The inverse percolation process does not occur overnight. It 
takes time for cases to arise with factual and legal patterns 
appropriate for lower court application of a particular Supreme 
Court opinion. And it takes time for such cases to reach the high 
state courts, and to be found throughout the various federal 
circuit courts. Eventually, Supreme Court decision influence will 
surface in the lower courts as they comply with the reasoning 
handed down, but this compliance may not always be 
automatic.33 Indeed, it has been suggested that other factors, like 
the age of an overruled precedent, for example, will play into a 
lowers court’s decision of how quickly it will implement such 
precedent.34 But when sufficient time has passed, an investigation 
of the inverse percolation results can be fruitful. Thus, time is an 
essential element in reflective analysis, reasonably requiring 
several years.  
I suggest four years is an adequate inverse percolation time 
window to capture a well-developed snapshot of lower court 
application, misapplication, or in-application of the precedent set 
by a Supreme Court decision. Reed is, therefore, a good case to 
examine. At the time of its release, the decision evoked strong 
reactions among commentators who shared dire predictions 
 
 31 Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony 
of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 348 
(2008). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We 
have in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, 
periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts 
may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of 
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 389, 439 (2004) (“Embracing the concept of percolation demonstrates a willingness 
to tolerate disuniformity for a time—the period needed for multiple lower courts to 
address an issue and flesh out the relevant considerations—but not necessarily forever.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of 
Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 534 (2002). 
 34 Id. at 537. 
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about the breadth and scope of its impacts.35 A meaningful 
assessment of Reed’s effects may now be conducted because time 
has passed, and the inverse percolation process has been active 
for several years. Before looking at the literature the decision 
generated or the categorization of courts’ post-Reed applications, 
a review of the Reed litigation, its journey to the Supreme Court, 
and the Court’s analysis of its First Amendment issue will be 
useful. The next Part takes on that task. 
III. A PEBBLE IS CAST 
Reed is an interesting case on its merits alone, especially to First 
Amendment scholars and practitioners, since it addressed an 
important First Amendment issue dealing with content-based 
regulations and mended a circuit split on the same. More importantly 
here, however, it is a case that is well-situated for the type of 
examination described in this Comment. Reed was decided in 2015.36 
The Court’s decision in Reed induced a reaction among constitutional 
law professors and other scholars who predicted far-reaching 
impacts.37 We are at a good spot now to reflect and see if any of those 
predicted impacts have materialized. 
The Reed case involved how, why, and to what extent a city 
could regulate the placement of signs around town for various 
events.38 Seemingly simple on its face, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve a three-way circuit split on 
determining content-neutrality and, thus, the appropriate level 
of scrutiny. The level of scrutiny applied in Reed hinged on 
whether the laws regulating the signs were content-based or 
content-neutral.39 Thus, the question before the Court focused on 
the subsection of First Amendment jurisprudence dealing with 
content-neutral analyses.40 The Reed case evolved as follows. 
A. Reed v. Town of Gilbert  
1. Background 
In the Town of Gilbert, Arizona, Clyde Reed served as the 
pastor of Good News Community Church, a small congregation 
that owned no building and held Sunday services at various 
 
 35 See infra Part III.  
 36 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 37 See infra Part IV(A). 
 38 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2221–22. 
 39 Id. at 2228. 
 40 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1204 (2013) (“In examining 
the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression . . . any law can be reviewed to 
determine whether it is content-based or content-neutral . . . .”). 
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locations throughout the town.41 To inform the public and its 
parishioners of each weekend’s service location, the church would 
post fifteen to twenty signs every Saturday morning and remove 
them midday on Sunday.42 The signs were mainly posted in 
public right-of-way areas.43  
Unfortunately for Pastor Reed, the Town of Gilbert had 
enacted the Gilbert, Arizona Land Development Code (“Sign 
Code”) which regulated signs throughout the city.44 The Sign 
Code required parties posting outdoor signs within the town’s 
limits to obtain a permit, but it exempted twenty three categories 
of signs from the permitting provision.45 Pastor Reed’s signs 
qualified as “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a 
Qualifying Event” (“Qualifying Event Signs”), one of the 
exempted classifications, and, as such, were subject to 
restrictions on size, placement, and display duration.46 The 
church was cited by the town twice for leaving signs up longer 
than the permissible thirteen hours, and, when Pastor Reed 
attempted to negotiate with the Sign Code Compliance 
Department, he was informed “there would be ‘no leniency under 
the Code’ and . . . any future violations” would be punished.47 
Pastor Reed and the Good News Community Church sued the 
Town of Gilbert, claiming the Sign Code violated the First 
Amendment by abridging their freedom of speech.48 
2. Reed Analysis and Holding 
The Court analyzed the question presented in Reed by 
examining the varying constraints on three Sign Code 
exceptions: Ideological Signs, Political Signs, and the 
aforementioned Qualifying Event Signs.49 By noting the obvious 
differences in restraints on each sign category, the Court 
pointed out the Sign Code favored some types of signs over 
others;50 therefore, the Sign Code was content-based on its face.51 
This conclusion triggered strict scrutiny, whereby, in order to be 
constitutional, the Sign Code needed to be found to serve a 
compelling government interest and needed to achieve that 
 
 41 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 2224. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 2224–25. 
 47 Id. at 2225–26. 
 48 Id. at 2226. 
 49 Id. at 2224–25. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 2227. 
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interest in the least restrictive manner possible.52 Although the 
government had offered justifications for enacting the Sign Code 
in the lower court, the Supreme Court deemed these justifications 
irrelevant in light of the fact that the ordinance was content-based 
on its face.53 The Supreme Court refuted each of the arguments 
the government presented in support of content-neutrality.54 Then, 
the Court systematically dismantled the Ninth Circuit’s finding of 
content-neutrality based on lack of governmental intent to 
discriminate,55 as well as assertions that there existed no 
differential treatment based on viewpoint or speaker.56 The Sign 
Code did not survive strict scrutiny. The Court found the Sign 
Code to be unconstitutional because the City of Gilbert had no 
valid reason for crafting it in a manner that showed favoritism to 
some categories of signs but not to others.57 
3. Reed Concurrences 
Although one adage claims “great minds think alike,” I 
prefer Thomas Paine’s quip: “I do not believe that any two 
men . . . think alike who think at all. It is only those who have 
not thought that appear to agree.”58 Perhaps this observation is 
well-suited to describe many Court opinions, and so it was in 
Reed. Justice Thomas penned the majority opinion described 
above, and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Sotomayor.59 However, three 
concurring opinions were also put forth by the Court. 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor,60 
filed a concurring opinion in which he noted that “[p]roperly 
understood, today’s decision will not prevent cities from 
regulating signs in a way that fully protects public safety and 
serves legitimate esthetic objectives.”61 This is because Justice 
Alito took the view that, although the Reed regulations were 
“replete with content-based distinctions, and . . . must satisfy 
strict scrutiny. . . . This does not mean . . . municipalities are 
 
 52 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006).  
 53 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 54 Id. at 2228–31. 
 55 Id. at 2228–29 (“[A]n innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-
based law into one that is content neutral.”). 
 56 Id. at 2230 (“[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content 
based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.”). 
 57 Id. at 2232. 
 58 THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man. Part the Second. Combining Principle and Practice, in 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 262, 360 (Ian Shapiro & Jane E. Calvert eds., 2014).  
 59 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 60 Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 61 Id. at 2233–34. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:52 AM 
2020] Ripples in the Pond 217 
powerless to enact and enforce reasonable sign regulations.”62 He 
then provided a non-comprehensive list of “rules that would not 
be content based,” including rules “regulating the size of signs,” 
“distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs,” and 
“restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile of 
roadway,” to name a few.63 
Although Justice Breyer also concurred in the judgment,64 he 
wrote a solo opinion arguing that “content discrimination . . . cannot 
and should not always trigger strict scrutiny”65 because “virtually 
all government activities involve speech, many of which involve the 
regulation of speech. . . . [And] [r]egulatory programs almost always 
require content discrimination.”66 Thus, according to Justice Breyer, 
“to hold that such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is 
to write a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government 
regulatory activity.”67 He further expressed fears of “watering 
down” strict scrutiny, and offered: 
The better approach is to generally treat content discrimination as a 
strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule . . . but 
elsewhere treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but not 
determinative legal tool . . . to determine the strength of a justification.68  
Justice Kagan entered a third concurring opinion, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,69 in which she opined that the 
majority was reaching too far. “We apply strict scrutiny to 
facially content-based regulations of speech . . . when there is any 
‘realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.’”70 
Furthermore, the “concern with content-based regulation arises 
from the fear that the government will skew the public’s debate 
of ideas—so when ‘that risk is inconsequential, . . . strict scrutiny 
is unwarranted.’”71 Justice Kagan found the “Town of Gilbert’s 
defense of its sign ordinance . . . [did] not pass strict scrutiny, or 
 
 62 Id. at 2233. 
 63 Id. Additional content neutral categories of rules were offered by Justice Alito in 
his concurrence: rules regulating the locations in which signs may be placed; rules 
distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs; rules distinguishing between signs 
with fixed messages and electronic signs with messages that change; rules that 
distinguish between the placement of signs on private and public property; rules 
distinguishing between the placement of signs on commercial and residential property; 
and rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. Again, Justice 
Alito does “not attempt to provide anything like a comprehensive list,” but opines that the 
rules he has listed would not be content-based. Id.  
 64 Id. at 2234. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 2235. 
 69 Id. at 2236. 
 70 Id. at 2237 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)). 
 71 Id. at 2238 (quoting Davenport, 551 U.S. at 188). 
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intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.”72 She concluded: “I 
suspect this Court and others will regret the majority’s [finding] 
today . . . [as] [t]his Court may soon find itself a veritable 
Supreme Board of Sign Review.”73 
It is doubtful that the Reed case ruling generated many 
cheers outside the realm of those directly involved. Rather, it 
produced furrowed brows, uncertainty, and disagreement,74 as 
the concurrences seemed to suggest varying avenues of thought 
would ultimately converge in upholding a decision in Pastor 
Reed’s favor. It has yet to be determined how significant the 
effects of Reed will eventually be and how far its reach will 
eventually extend.  
B. Journey to the U.S. Supreme Court 
Reed had appeared to call for a straight-forward application 
of the First Amendment by the Ninth Circuit. But cases like Reed 
can find their way in front of the United States Supreme Court 
because there has been disagreement among the lower courts 
over how they should be handled.75 Indeed, Reed presented the 
Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve a circuit split and 
instruct on the appropriate test to use in similar situations. The 
Court’s resolution of this split aligned with four of the circuits, 
leaving those in the remaining circuits to question the Court’s 
wisdom, and to postulate on widespread application of Reed to 
the detriment of First Amendment jurisprudence.76  
1. Ninth Circuit’s Dealings with Reed 
Reed was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona in 2008,77 and the Ninth Circuit was afforded 
two opportunities to rule on the matter.78 When the District 
Court first concluded the Sign Code was content-neutral and 
survived intermediate scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and 
remanded the case to consider whether the differential treatment 
of “Ideological . . ., Political . . ., and Qualifying Event Signs” was 
 
 72 Id. at 2239. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See, e.g., David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 359, 360 (2015) (referring to Reed inter alia, “I argue that the Court has struck the 
wrong doctrinal balance in these areas . . . .”). 
 75 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 6, § 3506.  
 76 See infra Part III.  
 77 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., No. 07-CV-522-PHX-SRB, 2008 WL 11339947 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 78 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 587 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Reed I]; 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Reed II]. 
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constitutional.79 On remand, the District Court repeated its 
previous findings regarding content-neutrality and the 
satisfaction of intermediate scrutiny,80 and the Ninth Circuit 
again affirmed.81 The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve a three-way circuit split over how to properly 
distinguish between content-based and content-neutral laws.82 It 
has been suggested that the three-way circuit split developed out 
of lower courts’ “discomfort” with the idea that “all distinctions 
between speech based on content are presumptively 
impermissible.”83 In other words, it seems that courts may have 
trouble concurrently applying the idea that speech may not be 
categorized and treated disparately, yet some types of speech, 
such as commercial speech, are deemed to be of lower value.84  
2. Circuit Split 
An “on-its-face” test, such as was applied in Reed,85 had not 
been uniformly applied across the circuits for determining 
content-neutrality pre-2015. The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits, among others, deemed laws to be content-neutral if the 
government could offer a content-neutral justification or pure 
legislative motive for the law.86 These “practical” circuits87 
employed a “motive-based test” that allowed content-neutrality to 
be found in the absence of a showing of governmental intent to 
create content-based law.88 In contrast, the “absolutist”89 First, 
 
 79 Reed I, 587 F.3d at 973, 983.  
 80 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 81 Reed II, 707 F.3d at 1077. 
 82 Id. at 1057, cert. granted, 573 U.S. 957 (July 1, 2014) (No. 13–502). 
 83 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of (Dis)content?, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 137, 144 (2015) [hereinafter Bhagwat, (Dis)content]. See also Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1429–30 (2017) 
(“[T]he reason why lower courts disagree about the definition of content discrimination, and 
why the Supreme Court itself has not been consistent on this question, is an unstated 
discomfort with the implications of the all-speech-is-equal premise. The truth is that this 
premise simply does not coincide with the instincts of most citizens and—importantly—most 
judges. As a result, when a law that regulates fully protected speech that seems less socially 
valuable than speech at the core of First Amendment’s protections is coupled with a strong, 
albeit likely not ‘compelling,’ government reason to restrict the speech, judges regularly look 
to avoid labeling the law as content-based, even when it is clearly so.”); Genevieve Lakier, 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 
2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 235 (2016) (“[N]otwithstanding the conflicting instructions they 
received from the Supreme Court, lower courts frequently held that laws that made facial 
content distinctions were content-neutral.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2000). 
 85 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). 
 86 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (No. 13–502). 
 87 Leah K. Brady, Lawn Sign Litigation: What Makes a Statute Content-Based for 
First Amendment Purposes?, 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 319, 333 (2016). 
 88 See, e.g., Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding a law 
“may distinguish speech based on its content so long as its reasons for doing so are not 
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Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits judged content-neutrality 
by examining the law’s terms,90 characterized as a “text-based 
test.”91 And the Third Circuit developed a more complex five-part 
“‘context-sensitive’ test”92 that weighed the value of the message 
at a given location against the underlying regulatory interests.93 
In light of this discontinuity, it is not surprising that the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Reed.  
C. Reed’s First Amendment Application 
In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court used Reed 
to establish a uniform test for determining whether a law is 
content-based or content-neutral.94 This test begins with “the 
crucial first step” of “determining whether the law is content 
neutral on its face.”95 It follows that “[a] law that is content 
based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the 
government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or 
lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated 
speech.”96 Thus, if a municipal code “imposes content-based 
restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if they 
survive strict scrutiny . . . .”97  
Reed solidified how courts should approach content-neutral 
versus content-based analyses, and the ensuing effect is best 
understood by examining subsequent court interpretations and 
applications of Reed. It may appear that, strictly speaking, Reed 
addressed an extremely narrow portion of First Amendment law, 
 
based on the message conveyed”); H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 
609, 621 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding an ordinance to be content-neutral as long as “the 
regulation was not adopted because of disagreement with the message that the speech 
conveys”). See also the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Reed I and Reed II.  
 89 Brady, supra note 87, at 333. 
 90 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 86, at 19. 
 91 Id. at 21. See also Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 
737 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding sign code distinctions based solely on the message conveyed 
to be impermissible); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1264 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (finding exemptions from obtaining a permit to fly a flag bearing government or 
religious insignia to be content-based); Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 
551, 557 (2d Cir. 1990) (ruling exemptions of political signs and signs identifying a grand 
opening, parade, festival, fund drive, or similar occasion from a general sign ban 
unconstitutional); Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting 
a sign code that facially banned political signs but permitted for sale, professional office, 
and religious and charitable cause signs to be content-based). 
 92 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 86, at 25. 
 93 Id. at 18–19. See also Rappa v. New Castle Cty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1087 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(finding a “For Sale” sign to be entitled to greater First Amendment protection than a 
political sign). 
 94 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). 
 95 Id. (emphasis added).  
 96 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
429 (1993)). 
 97 Id. at 2231. 
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only applying to how municipalities regulate signs. But it can be 
argued the actual reach of the opinion is much wider. As of 2012, 
there were 35,886 municipalities and townships in the United 
States,98 each of which would be subject to suit for any facial 
distinctions in their sign regulations if we use the narrowest 
possible application of Reed. If that application is expanded to 
examine facial distinctions in any municipal ordinance, 
regardless of subject, it is likely the effects from the Reed 
decision would expand significantly.  
For the purposes of this Comment, Reed is an important case 
chronologically because it is not so far past as to create an 
unmanageable review of its subsequent appearance in general 
jurisprudence. The number of cases that have cited to Reed is 
currently high enough to yield a significant population to be 
examined and categorized, but is not so high as to make the 
review of the citations daunting. Therefore, this case analysis 
will be illuminating. Before examining the cases that have cited 
to Reed, it will be useful in the next part to review the literature 
that the Reed decision spawned—literature which expressed 
fears of how far Reed’s impacts would be felt. These Reed 
predictions will then be measured against the actual manifested 
repercussions summarized in Part IV. 
IV. THE PREDICTED RIPPLES 
A survey of the post-Reed literature is instructive, as it contains 
predictions of Reed’s reach. By reviewing the variety of published 
and expressed impact forecasts, a backdrop can be painted against 
which Reed’s effects become apparent. That is, comparison of Reed’s 
implementation by the lower courts to the hypothesized 
repercussions expressed in law reviews and the public forum yields 
a richer understanding of the decision’s true reach, and enables us 
to judge the accuracy of its predictive literature. 
In the immediate aftermath of Reed, colorful remarks such 
as “Reed has set off a firestorm”99 were not unfamiliar. The Reed 
decision was handed down by the Court in June 2015 and, almost 
immediately, prophesies about how lower courts would use the 
decision as an excuse to run rough-shod over other areas of First 
Amendment law arose in the public forum and in legal 
literature.100 Such forecasts have continued to trickle out in law 
 
 98 Census Bureau Reports There Are 89,004 Local Governments in the United States, 
U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/ 
governments/cb12-161.html [http://perma.cc/AH9Z-ZC9R]. 
 99 Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65, 66 (2017). 
 100 See infra Part IV(A).  
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review articles since.101 The current body of literature that cites 
to Reed ranges from single footnote mentions that are largely 
inconsequential, to textual allusions assuming pre-existing Reed 
knowledge,102 to brief fact and holding descriptions,103 to analyses 
of Reed’s impact on particular doctrines or topics,104 to entire 
articles devoted to the Reed case and its ensuing doctrine.105  
This Part reviews the Reed impacts prophesized by those in 
the public forum and by authors of law review articles, as well as 
consequences noted from the bench. Although many 
commentators addressed how they felt Reed would affect 
American jurisprudence in general, some focused on its 
significance with respect to particular doctrines, while some 
expressed estimations of exaggerated eventualities. 
A. Reed’s Hypothesized Impacts  
1. Impacts Recognized in the Public Forum  
When Reed was decided on June 18, 2015, a posting by law 
professor Eugene Volokh appeared on The Washington Post 
website the same day.106 The post summarized the Reed case, the 
Court holding, and the three concurrences, then critically raised 
questions about the decision’s ramifications on the secondary 
effects doctrine, on Hill v. Colorado, and on the preservation of 
the marketplace of ideas.107 Altogether, Volokh felt Reed had 
reached too far in mandating the application of strict scrutiny, 
noting that “[w]e can administer our content-regulation doctrine 
 
 101 For example, on Westlaw there are two law review articles published in 2019 that 
substantially address Reed. See e.g., Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed's 
Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191 (2019). 
 102 See Mark Chenoweth, Expressions Hair Design: Detangling the Commercial-Free-Speech 
Knot, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227, 234; Mary Christine Brady, Comment, Enforcing an 
Unenforceable Law: The National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 67 EMORY L.J. 
771, 774 (2018).  
 103 See Kyle Langvardt, A Model of First Amendment Decision-Making at a Divided 
Court, 84 TENN. L. REV. 833, 849 (2017); Maura Douglas, Comment, Finding Viewpoint 
Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 727, 732 (2018).  
 104 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech is Not “Speech”, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 847 (2017); 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 385, 388 (2017); Joseph Mead, Why We Need Reed: Unmasking Pretext 
in Anti-Panhandling Legislation, 7 CONLAWNOW 37, 38 (2015). 
 105 See Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation After Reed: Suggestions 
for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 URB. LAW. 569, 570 (2015); Urja Mittal, Note, The 
“Supreme Board of Sign Review”: Reed and Its Aftermath, 125 YALE L.J.F. 359, 359 (2016). 
 106 Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court reaffirms broad prohibition on content-based 
speech restrictions, in today’s Reed v. Town of Gilbert decision, WASH. POST (June 18, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/18/supreme-
court-reaffirms-broad-prohibition-on-content-based-speech-restrictions-in-todays-reed-v-
town-of-gilbert-decision/?utm_term=.501e5173cee0 [http://perma.cc/9WX4-F5RB]. 
 107 Id. 
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with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in 
no way implicate its intended function.”108 
That same summer, another criticism of the High Court’s 
Reed decision surfaced in the public forum.109 On August 17, 2015, 
The New York Times published an article by its Supreme Court 
correspondent, Adam Liptak, that analyzed Reed as “the sleeper 
case of the last Supreme Court term.”110 Liptak claimed Reed had 
“transformed the First Amendment” and “mark[ed] an important 
shift toward treating countless laws that regulate speech with 
exceptional skepticism.”111 Robert Post, the Dean of Yale Law 
School, opined in the article that the Reed “decision was so bold 
and so sweeping that the Supreme Court could not have thought 
through its consequences.”112 Moreover, Dean Post claimed “the 
[Reed] majority opinion, read literally, would so destabilize First 
Amendment law that courts might have to . . . rethink what counts 
as speech . . . or . . . water down the potency of strict scrutiny.”113 
2. Impacts Predicted in Law Review Articles 
One exemplar of the law review coverage of Reed concluded 
that “[a]lthough prominent legal minds differ in their reactions to 
the decision, most agree that [Reed] will have influential and 
significant effects on laws that regulate speech.”114 As of this 
writing, there are over 340 law review articles available on 
Westlaw that cite to Reed.115 Some discuss the case; some refer to 
it only via footnote. Of the approximately fifty-five articles 
criticizing Reed, the common thread seems to be an expressed 
apprehension over expansive application of the Reed result to 
other areas of First Amendment law, and beyond. A sampling of 
these articles is discussed below. 
Some of the initial articles written in the latter half of 2015 
conveyed concerns such as: “[I]n Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S. 
Supreme Court may have opened the door to a broader 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-
speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html [http://perma.cc/6TLE-RX22].  
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Jacquelyn M. Lyons, Comment, The Future Implications for Ag-Gag Laws, 47 
SETON HALL L. REV. 915, 928 (2017). 
 115 As of January 30, 2019, Westlaw had linked 342 law review articles to the Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert case under the Secondary Sources subsection of the associated Citing References tab. 
WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (from 135 S. Ct. 2218, follow “Citing References” tab; then filter by 
“Secondary Sources” and “Law Reviews”). 
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application of strict scrutiny”116 since “the opinion is startlingly 
broad and attempts to apply a one-size-fits-all approach despite 
the nuances of First Amendment doctrine.”117 Additionally, it was 
feared that “the Courts [sic] ruling was so broad that . . . it has 
transformed First Amendment jurisprudence as a whole. . . . [It] 
appears to greatly expand the reach of First Amendment 
rights.”118 These initial worries of a sweeping application of the 
decision have remained a theme in Reed critiques, although some 
articles focused on Reed’s impact on a particular subject or doctrine. 
a. Broad Application 
The fear of broad application has been addressed by many 
commentators. For example, in 2016, Genevieve Lakier authored 
an article titled, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of 
the Anticlassificatory First Amendment,119 in which she decried 
Reed’s sweeping application: “Reed thus represents an important 
change in First Amendment doctrine, and one that will in all 
likelihood have a significant impact in many areas of law.”120 
Whereas some pre-Reed jurisprudence applied intermediate 
scrutiny to laws where the government could demonstrate no 
intent to discriminate, Lakier opined that Reed’s approach of first 
subjecting the statute or ordinance to an on-its-face evaluation of 
content-neutrality “likely imperils many laws that pose no 
significant threat to First Amendment interests.”121 She worried:  
This may only be the tip of the iceberg. By insisting that strict 
scrutiny applies to all laws that treat speakers differently because of 
the content of their speech, Reed potentially imperils the hundreds, 
even perhaps thousands, of local, state, and federal laws that make 
subject matter or viewpoint distinctions.122  
Lakier claimed Reed produced “a test of content-based 
lawmaking that is both too broad and too narrow.”123 
Such concerns were echoed the following year in a note by 
James Andrew Howard titled, Salvaging Commercial Speech 
Doctrine: Reconciling Reed v. Town of Gilbert with Constitutional 
 
 116 Erika Schutzman, Note, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for a Consistent 
Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First 
Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2051 (2015). 
 117 Id. at 2054–55. 
 118 Matthew Hector, Groundbreaking Supreme Court Opinion Dooms Panhandling 
Law, 103 ILL. B.J. 15, 15 (2015). 
 119 Lakier, supra note 83, at 233. 
 120 Id. at 235. 
 121 Id. at 274–77. 
 122 Id. at 235. Lakier suggested that this result is perhaps not surprising, as it 
“demonstrates once again the pronounced deregulatory tilt of the Roberts Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 235–36. 
 123 Id. at 296. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:52 AM 
2020] Ripples in the Pond 225 
Free Speech Tradition.124 Howard claimed that “if taken at face 
value, [Reed] would reverse the Court’s extensive case law 
determining that certain categories of speech are more valuable 
than others, and thus, that different categories may be regulated 
in different ways.”125 In particular, Howard opined that Reed’s 
impacts could not have been fully realized by the Court as the 
“decision unintentionally overturns thousands of federal, state, 
and local regulations, implicitly revokes clearly established 
Supreme Court case law, and ignores other governmental and 
public interests . . . .”126  
Claudia Haupt, in her article, Professional Speech and the 
Content-Neutrality Trap,127 suspected Reed of being a harbinger 
of First Amendment change: “Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Florida . . . reflects a new form of aggressive content neutrality 
on the rise in First Amendment jurisprudence beginning with 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert.”128 Haupt felt that “Reed ushered in 
what may turn out to be a dramatic shift in the way courts 
employ content-neutrality as a core principle of the First 
Amendment.”129 Although the article addresses professional 
speech, Haupt notes that “[t]aken literally, [Reed] could plausibly 
encompass ‘any regulation that even incidentally distinguishes 
between activities or industries.’ In short, the potential doctrinal 
impact of Reed is sweeping.”130 
Moreover, according to Emily Jessup in When “Free Coffee” 
Violates the First Amendment,131 after the Court in Reed gave a 
“sweeping definition of ‘content based,’”132 it was “likely setting 
the stage for many more challenges across the country.”133 She 
pointed out that “the majority [has] departed from previous 
standards”134 and “‘rearticulated the standard for when 
regulation of speech is content based,’ possibly changing the 
 
 124 James Andrew Howard, Comment, Salvaging Commercial Speech Doctrine: Reconciling 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert with Constitutional Free Speech Tradition, 27 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. 
L.J. 239, 239 (2017). 
 125 Id. at 243. 
 126 Id. at 244. 
 127 Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE 
L.J.F. 150 (2017). 
 128 Id. at 150. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 162 (footnote omitted) (quoting Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1987 (2016)). 
 131 Emily Jessup, When “Free Coffee” Violates the First Amendment: The Federal Highway 
Beautification Act After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 73 (2017). 
 132 Id. at 75. 
 133 Id. at 94.  
 134 Id. at 80. 
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content-neutrality analysis for all government ordinances.”135 
Thus, similar to the opinions expressed by Howard, Jessup 
concluded that the “Supreme Court’s decision [in Reed] . . . has 
had far-reaching effects, . . . [which have] fundamentally changed 
the content-neutrality analysis . . . .”136  
These commentators are just a few who expressed the 
common thought that the Reed decision was too broad and 
sweeping, and potentially impacted a wide range of government 
regulations.137 Yet another commentator provided a good 
summary of these concerns, opining that Reed presented a 
“[d]octrinal distortion,”138 because usually there is a “very low 
likelihood that forbidden governmental motives are involved . . . [and 
there is a] limited extent to which such ordinances are likely to 
distort the marketplace of ideas.”139 
b. Topical Application 
The literature criticizing the Court’s ruling in Reed is also 
peppered with applications of the Reed reasoning to specific 
topics and doctrines. One such topic of concern was commercial 
speech,140 as it was feared that “[f]ull [a]pplication of Reed 
[w]ould [e]viscerate [c]ommercial [s]peech [d]octrine.”141 Since it 
was handed down in 1980, the four-part Central Hudson test142 
 
 135 Id. at 78 (quoting Anthony D. Lauriello, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2016)) (footnote omitted). 
 136 Id. at 94. 
 137 See also Margaret Rosso Grossman, Genetically Engineered Animals in the United 
States: The AquAdvantage Salmon, 11 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 190, 199 (2016) (“[T]he 
Reed decision may pose barriers to required labels on GE food.”); Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Ag-Gag 
Free Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 669, 678 (2016) (“Reed may constitute a game changer 
with regard to the constitutionality of ag-gag legislation . . . .”); Amanda Shanor, The New 
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 179 (2016) (“[W]ere Reed applied universally as advocates 
urge, the commercial speech doctrine—along with other topic-based sub-doctrines such as 
those that currently permit the greater regulation of child pornography, obscenity, fraud, 
perjury, price-fixing, conspiracy, or solicitation—would be rendered obsolete, thereby 
rendering large swaths of the administrative state presumptively unconstitutional.”); Nat 
Stern, Judicial Candidates’ Right to Lie, 77 MD. L. REV. 774, 796–97 (2018) (“[Reed] 
criterion appears to collapse the distinction between content regulation and subject-matter 
regulation.”); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark 
Registration and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2016) (applying Reed to 
federal law governing trademarks, via the Lanham Act). 
 138 Han, supra note 74, at 405. 
 139 Id. at 407. 
 140 Lee Mason, Comment, Content Neutrality and Commercial Speech Doctrine After 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 968 (2017) (“[C]ommercial speech, quite 
simply, is speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” (quoting Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))). 
 141 Id. at 983. 
 142 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful 
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has been applied to commercial speech regulations imposing 
intermediate scrutiny,143 because commercial speech is accorded 
lesser protection than other speech on the grounds that speech 
proposing a commercial transaction takes a subordinate position 
in the scale of First Amendment values.144 To extend Reed to 
commercial speech would demand such ordinances pass strict 
scrutiny. It was feared, therefore, that the well-developed 
commercial speech doctrine would be undermined by a 
heightened level of review, and more—if not most¾commercial 
speech regulations would now be found unconstitutional.145 This 
hypothetical was perhaps not far-fetched, as it is not an 
irrational stretch to think—at least for signs—that courts could 
find a commercial sign regulation content-based on its face simply 
because it differentiates between commercial and non-commercial 
signs. When one commentator doubted that such an application 
would be made, he nonetheless noted that tension exists in this 
area of First Amendment law.146 
It was also feared that application of Reed would destroy the 
secondary effects doctrine under which government agencies 
were permitted to craft statutes “designed to combat the 
undesirable secondary effects” of speech.147 Again, although the 
Supreme Court was silent in this regard in Reed, concern was 
voiced that the Reed whale would swallow the secondary effects 
Jonah.148 Reed seemed, to some, to “signify a coming . . . change 
 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”). 
 143 Id. at 564. 
 144 See, e.g., Post, supra note 84, at 3. 
 145 Howard, supra note 124, at 244 (“If Reed is to be taken on its face, then any 
separate distinctions for commercial speech must be implicitly overturned.”); Mason, 
supra note 140, at 983 (“Based on this straightforward reading, then, one could argue that 
content-based regulations, whether facial or justification based, will trigger strict 
scrutiny, even with respect to commercial speech. Although this solution seems 
straightforward, complete application of Reed to commercial speech would essentially 
overrule all existing commercial speech doctrine.”); Shanor, supra note 137, at 179 (“Reed 
sub silentio overruled decades of commercial speech precedent, including landmark 
commercial speech cases such as Central Hudson and Zauderer.”). 
 146 Shanor, supra note 137, at 179 (“While it strains credulity, in the words of the late 
Justice Scalia, to suggest that the Supreme Court hid such an elephant in the mouse hole 
of a relatively obscure case about an Arizona sign ordinance, Reed, . . . signals growing 
tension between various First Amendment sub-doctrines.” (footnote omitted)). 
 147 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (observing the secondary 
effects doctrine is mainly applied to adult entertainment regulations). 
 148 Jacobs, supra note 104, at 388–89 (“[T]he Supreme Court has shot a missile into 
its own [secondary effects] reasoning. . . . It could be that the six Justices in the Reed 
majority meant to sweep away four decades of precedent and subject the full range of 
detailed zoning, public health and safety regulations imposed by localities across the 
country . . . to the most demanding level of Free Speech Clause scrutiny. But this 
conclusion would ignore the Justices’ steadfast cultivation, development, and embrace of 
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in how American municipalities regulate their streets . . . .”149 All 
in all, many suspected that Reed had “complicat[ed] government 
efforts to regulate speech in furtherance of state interests.”150 
c. Extreme Views 
Various, rather unlikely, predictions of Reed have been 
offered as well, such as: “Reed is so wildly inconsistent with so 
much of existing law that the Court probably did not mean what 
it said;”151 “It is hard to tell what weight to give to Reed, because 
it is hard to believe the Court is serious;”152 “Justice Thomas’s 
doctrine would have courts repent of these earlier sins and hew 
to the formal variant unbendingly in all future cases;”153 and 
“Reed’s hard line is almost certainly too extreme to hold . . . .”154  
Additionally, others predicted that “[i]n Reed, Justice Thomas 
articulated a new standard for courts to assess the content 
neutrality of laws regulating speech, a move likely to have profound 
consequences on a broad array of subjects.”155 Or, that “the term 
‘content-based’ as recently used in Reed is unsustainably 
overbroad,”156 thus a “corrosive First Amendment . . . emerges from 
Reed.”157 These predictions of improbable results demonstrate the 
severity of suspicion with which some viewed the Reed outcome. 
3. Impacts Noted from the Bench 
Critiques of the Reed holding was not limited to the 
academic legal community or the public forum. Judges applying 
Reed expressed their opinions on the case in the midst of their 
written decisions as well. The following examples illustrate: 
[T]he Supreme Court complicated matters when it issued its opinion 
in Reed.158  
 
Secondary Effects Analysis, in the face of persistent and persuasive external and internal 
criticism over many years.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 149 Anthony D. Lauriello, Note, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2016). 
 150 Anna S. Roy, Comment, Ninth Circuit Applies Intermediate Scrutiny to Mandated 
Abortion Clinic Notices¾Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th 
Cir. 2016), Cert. Granted in Part Sub Nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
No. 16-1140, 2017 WL 5240894 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2017) (mem.), 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 771, 
775 (2017). 
 151 Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty 
Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2016). 
 152 Id. at 1159. 
 153 Langvardt, supra note 103, at 851. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Lauriello, supra note 149, at 1106 (footnote omitted). 
 156 Tushnet, supra note 137, at 412. 
 157 Id. at 423. 
 158 Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149, 174 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(Rendell, J., dissenting). 
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Our sister circuits have also noted that Reed represents a drastic 
change in First Amendment jurisprudence.159  
The majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction 
between content regulation and subject-matter regulation.160 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert then worked a sea [of] change in First 
Amendment law.161 
[A]mbiguity . . . remains in the wake of Reed regarding how broadly or 
narrowly courts must interpret the subject matters between which a 
government speech restriction distinguishes . . . .162 
“Reed did not relate to commercial speech, or mandatory disclosures 
as a part of commercial speech, and therefore did not have occasion to 
consider those doctrines.” To view it as doing so, and “to find a new 
First Amendment principle between the lines of Reed, is like trying ‘to 
find a black cat in a dark room, especially if there is no cat.’”163 
Additionally, Judge Gerald Tjoflat dissented in the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Wollschlaeger decision because of “the uncertainty 
introduced by Reed” and its “pernicious and far reaching 
effects.”164 He opined that “[t]he First Amendment trajectory 
created by the Reed majority carries with it the dangerous 
potential to legitimize judicial interference in the implementation 
of reasonable, democratically enacted laws. The First Amendment 
does not require such rigorous interventionism . . . .”165 
B. The Role of Lower Courts  
Commentary on the role of the lower courts is also 
instructive. For example, Minch Minchin opined in his article, A 
Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape:  
[T]he Supreme Court has been sending mixed signals to the lower 
federal courts by oscillating between definitions of the [First 
Amendment] doctrine, selectively applying it and carving out ad hoc 
exemptions that circumvent the doctrine’s purpose. Perhaps worse 
still, the high Court in Reed has now permitted an already-muddled 
doctrine to be possibly applied to a much greater number of cases, 
thus potentially pouring a generous measure of perplexing potion into 
the cauldron of confusion.166  
 
 159 Id. at n.7 at 176 (majority opinion). 
 160 Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 161 Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656, 666 (E.D. La. 2017). 
 162 Silberberg v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 272 F. Supp. 3d 454, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 163 Roland Dig. Media, Inc. v. City of Livingston, No. 2:17-CV-00069, 2018 WL 6788594, 
at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 26, 2018) (citations omitted) (quoting Nationwide Biweekly Admin., 
Inc. v. Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 732 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
 164 Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1331 (11th Cir. 2017) (Tjoflat, 
J., dissenting). 
 165 Id. at 1333. 
 166 Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 
22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 150–51 (2017) (footnote omitted). 
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Furthermore, he suggested that “[s]uch a broad, ill-defined canon 
has been of little use to federal jurists, who have essentially been 
asked to hit an amorphous and mobile doctrinal target.”167 But 
some of this application process that Minchin seems to denounce 
is an inevitable, par-for-the-course part of the structure of our 
legal system.168  
For example, when decisions such as Reed are handed down 
by the Supreme Court, it is the duty of the lower courts to apply 
the case law developed therein.169 However, findings do not come 
with an instructional manual on how to apply them. Details as to 
exactly how, when, and where the application should be made 
are not necessarily included in the four corners of the opinion. 
The lower courts, thus, take on the important task of absorbing 
high Court decisions into current jurisprudence.170 Although 
commentators like Minchin may be critical of some of the 
confusion this process can create, it is nonetheless the normal 
course of business in our American legal world.171  
Ashutosh Bhagwat suggested in his article, Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert: Signs of (Dis)Content?, that the existence of the Reed case 
“demonstrate[s] a fundamental confusion among the lower courts 
about the meaning of the phrase ‘content based.’”172 He also opined 
that there is “resistance on the part of the lower courts to the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that all content-based restrictions on 
protected speech are presumptively unconstitutional”173 because of 
their “discomfort with the foundational principle of modern free 
speech doctrine.”174 Similar resistance and discomfort most likely 
gave rise to the circuit split discussed earlier,175 thus prompting 
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Reed. Whether Reed 
helped relieve that discomfort and quell that resistance has yet to 
be determined; but, if such discomfort causes movement towards 
resolution, its results, as described by Minchin, may not be a bad 
thing. After all, “Reed’s potentially more radical implications may 
be domesticated by the lower courts.”176 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4478.3. 
 169 See, e.g., Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion 
in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 481–82 (2012). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4478.3. 
 172 Bhagwat, (Dis)content, supra note 83, at 137.  
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 144. 
 175 See supra Part III.  
 176 Lakier, supra note 83, at 293. 
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C. Existing Studies 
The mass of Reed literature was dense directly following the 
decision, but tapered off over time. The immediate articles 
tended to offer application predictions, but seemed to give way 
over time to more topical analyses of Reed’s influence. One of the 
only attempts to measure the reach of Reed did not surface until 
several years after the case, and only calculated the extent of the 
reach along a narrow strand of metrics.  
In April 2019, an article examining Reed’s influence was 
published in the Taylor & Francis Online journal, Communication 
Law and Policy.177 Authored by Dan Kozlowski and Derigan 
Silver—professors of communication, and media and journalism, 
respectively178—the article provided a look at U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals cases which cited to Reed from the time of its decision in 
June 2015, up through July 2018.179 It started off by detailing the 
distinctions between content-neutral, content-based, and 
viewpoint-based regulations180 and courts’ historic approaches to 
content,181 before moving into a circuit-by-circuit examination of 
the cases, particularly noting idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in 
Reed application within and among the circuits.182 The article then 
shifted to a discussion of whether Reed has operated as a clarifying 
lens through which content-based regulations can be viewed, or if it 
has only further muddied already murky waters.183 It concluded 
“that Reed has not produced the First Amendment revolution of 
Armageddon proportions that some commentators predicted.”184 
It is encouraging that their study reached a conclusion 
consistent with this Comment, although it is important to recognize 
that Kozlowski and Silver limited their examination to the subset of 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals cases applying Reed. The authors 
justified the constraint, saying “Circuit court cases were chosen 
because of the courts’ ability to set precedent and influence the law 
within their jurisdiction.”185 However, for Reed-citing cases 
 
 177 See generally Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content 
Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 191 (2019). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 191–92. The article notes that sixty-eight cases, resulting from a LexisNexis 
search of Reed citations, were reviewed by the authors. Id. at 192 n.7. However, only cases 
related to Reed’s approach on content discrimination were addressed. Id. at 215 n.176. 
The latest Reed-citing case in the article, Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, is dated July 31, 2018. Id. at 254 n.460. 
 180 See Kozlowski & Silver, supra note 177, at 193–97. 
 181 See id. at 197–208. 
 182 See id. at 215–59. 
 183 See id. at 263–70. 
 184 Id. at 259. 
 185 Id. at 192 n.7. 
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available through the time of this writing, such a limitation means 
examination of only 17% of the total cases available.186 The subset 
chosen by Kozlowski and Silver is an excellent introduction to the 
inquiry, but expansion of the set of cases examined is a profitable 
endeavor that reveals possible skews introduced by the choice of 
their subset. This Comment, therefore, considers all available State 
and Federal Court cases in order to paint a more detailed picture of 
how Reed has been accepted and implemented at all available 
court levels.  
The smaller subset of cases reviewed by Kozlowski and 
Silver enabled the authors to provide details of each case, as well 
as scrutiny of the reasoning of individual judges in each circuit.187 
There is value to such an in-depth assessment, particularly for 
attorneys deliberating whether to appeal a content-analysis case 
at the federal level. That level of analysis was manageable with 
their small sample. The same level of inspection on the almost 
500 cases which currently cite Reed would be daunting, and has 
not been attempted here. A higher-level review of State and 
Federal cases at all levels, noting only if Reed was applied and its 
result, however, is feasible and can provide a valuable 
alternative and wider angle from which to assess the impact of a 
case. Part IV of this Comment undertakes this type of 
altitudinous analysis, allowing a broader picture of Reed’s 
application to be painted. 
Kozlowski and Silver have provided an exemplary starting 
point for the type of analysis advocated herein. Their article is a 
welcome contribution to the body of literature on Reed, but, by 
the nature of its narrow focus, it creates an opportunity for 
extension. The gap they left open acts as an implicit invitation to 
fill it. This invitation for a broader review of courts at all levels, 
over an extended time frame, is accepted here and results in a 
broader, more detailed understanding of how the Reed approach 
has melded into our jurisprudence as a whole.  
The cases reviewed in Part IV of this Comment include, but 
are not limited to, the cases that Kozlowski and Silver studied, 
and the data gathered for this Comment’s analysis contains the 
same findings noted in the Kozlowski and Silver article. In 
addition to expanding the scope of courts analyzed and thereby 
increasing the size and diversity of the sample set of cases, this 
Comment’s analysis also benefits from a wider range of time 
studied, namely ten months of jurisprudential development 
beyond the Kozlowski and Silver analysis.  
 
 186 See infra Table 1 (83 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals cases / 477 cases total = 17%). 
 187 See Kozlowski & Silver, supra note 177, at 215–59. 
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As will be seen in Part V of this Comment, Kozlowski and 
Silver reach similar conclusions about the predictive literature. 
They found that “Reed has not been the basis of a First Amendment 
revolution,”188 thus, “[p]laintiffs have found . . . crying out ‘Reed’ 
does not instinctively bully a court into declaring that a regulation 
is content based.”189 Rather, their article concludes that “although 
Reed seemingly had the potential to be revolutionary,”190 so far it 
“hasn’t triggered any sort of dramatic overturning of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”191 This Comment, therefore, reinforces 
Kozlowski and Silver’s conclusions and builds upon their foundation 
by expanding the scope and diversity of courts, and by extending 
the time frame of court opinions considered. 
In summary, the Reed decision was not universally 
welcomed. The above review of hypothesized consequences 
provides a contextual backdrop against which the reality of 
Reed’s standing in case law today can be compared. We turn now 
to an examination of Reed’s actual application by lower courts. 
V. THE ACTUAL RIPPLES 
The import of a Supreme Court decision to American 
jurisprudence may not always be accurately measured by the 
extent of publicity or the volume of literature written immediately 
following the ruling. The true impact from the decision is best 
gauged by examining how the lower courts applied or 
distinguished the finding in the subsequent development of case 
law. As previously mentioned, this process of inverse percolation 
takes several years, but the study of its consequences yields a 
fuller understanding of a case’s true repercussions. 
A. Gathering the Data 
The data examined herein are cases that quote or cite to the 
Reed decision. An initial comparison of the number of Reed-linked 
cases available on LexisNexis versus Westlaw yielded a slightly 
higher number of cases on Westlaw; thus, Westlaw was chosen as 
the preferred repository from which cases were drawn for this 
impact investigation. Imposing a cut-off date for my review as 
May 21, 2019, I downloaded 477 cases. The cases were initially 
categorized as “State” or “Federal,” divided into calendar years, 
and then further parsed by jurisdictional level (i.e., U.S. District 
Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. Supreme Court, State 
 
 188 Id. at 193. 
 189 Id. at 263. 
 190 Id. at 270. 
 191 Id. at 259. 
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Appellate Court, and State High Court). This basic break-down is 
summarized in Table 1.192 
Table 1: Categorization of Reed Cases by Jurisdiction and Year 
Federal Cases 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL 
U.S. District 
Court 
40 76 82 81 46 325 
U.S. Courts of 
Appeals 
11 22 24 18 8 83 
U.S. 
Bankruptcy 
Court 
0 0 0 2 0 2 
U.S. Supreme 
Court 
4 0 1 1 0 6 
 
State Cases193 
      
State Appellate 
Court 
5 9 7 15 7 43 
State High 
Court 
2 5 2 6 3 18 
 
The distribution of State Cases among the states was fairly 
uniform, ranging from zero to four, with the exception of Ohio, 
Illinois, and Texas, which listed seven, nine, and fifteen cases, 
respectively. Overall, the State High Court level addressed 30% 
of the total number of Reed-citing State Cases.194 
Refining the Federal Case categories, the U.S. District 
Court cases were next grouped according to their respective 
Circuit. These totals are compared to the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
cases for each circuit in Table 2. Overall, the number of 
appellate level cases citing Reed was 20% of the total number of 
Federal Cases.195 
 
 192 It is noted that Westlaw (and LexisNexis) includes only state appellate and high 
court cases. The state trial courts produce such a sheer overwhelming volume of cases 
that inclusion is nigh impossible, and unwieldly at best. 
 193 State Cases were grouped by court level using the lists at Ballotpedia. See State supreme 
courts, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_courts [http://perma.cc/2L6S-
GP5W] (last visited June 3, 2019); Intermediate appellate courts, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Intermediate_appellate_courts#List_of_state_intermediate_appellate_courts 
[http://perma.cc/Y8SF-CGSU] (last visited June 3, 2019). 
 194 See supra Table 1 (Calculated as: (number of State High Court cases) / (number of 
State Appellate Court cases + number of State High Court cases) = 18 / (43 + 18) = 30%). 
 195 See supra Table 1 (Calculated as: (number of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases) / (number of 
U.S. Courts of Appeals cases + number of U.S. District Court cases) = 83 / (83 + 325) = 20%). 
For each Circuit individually, the number of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases over the total 
number of U.S. District Court cases and U.S. Courts of Appeals cases was, on average, 21%, 
with outliers being the D.C. Circuit (44%) and the Tenth Circuit (6%). 
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Table 2: Federal Reed Cases by Jurisdictional Level 
U.S. Circuit 
U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Cases 
U.S. District 
Court Cases 
1 6 19 
2 2 18 
3 5 17 
4 9 77 
5 4 18 
6 7 25 
7 9 36 
8 4 22 
9 21 50 
10 1 17 
11 6 17 
D.C. 7 9 
Federal 2 - 
TOTAL 83 325 
B. Summarizing the Data 
Having all the cases in-hand, I developed a spreadsheet to 
fill out as I reviewed each case. Included were the basics (case 
name, citation, date, court, case subject) and answers to a series 
of questions: 
(1) Does the case address First Amendment issues? 
(2) Are the Reed citations found in the body of the holding or 
only in footnotes? 
(3) Did the court apply Reed, and if so, how did the case fare? 
(4) If the court chose not to apply Reed, why not? 
(5) What level of discussion/analysis was given to Reed in 
the case? 
The spreadsheet was done in Excel to facilitate cross-parsing 
comparisons and the creation of tables.196 
C. Examining the Data 
Initial examination of the results necessitated a reduction of 
the data set to a meaningful subset. Since this Comment 
examines the impact of Reed on case opinions, I first chose to 
 
 196 Completed spreadsheet is available from author upon request. 
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exclude cases that only cited Reed in a footnote,197 as well as those 
which only mentioned Reed tangentially, as abrogating another 
case or applying the Fourteenth Amendment, for example.198 Also 
eliminated were intermediate rulings on any case199—including 
remands of cases to be considered in light of Reed200—since the 
interest here is limited to the ultimate application of the Reed 
decision. Finally, the cases that considered Reed, but whose 
holdings ultimately rested on other grounds, were omitted.201 
Thus, the data set discussed below contains 162 cases.  
1. Reed Distinguished 
Recall that the fears expressed in Part III above were 
mostly concerned with broad application of Reed to areas 
outside of municipal sign ordinances. Hence, we would have 
expected, based on these predictions, that the lower courts 
would rarely distinguish Reed, but instead use a broad reading 
to apply it to almost any situation. The data did not exhibit 
such a pattern. Rather, in forty-five of 154 cases,202 i.e., 29% of 
the time, the court distinguished Reed for the subjects listed in 
Table 3. That is, for the cases indexed in Table 3, the lower 
courts found that Reed—examining first content-neutrality, 
then applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulations—did 
not apply for their review of the law at issue. 
 
 197 Out of 477 cases examined, fifty-one contained reference to Reed in a footnote only. 
 198 Included here are the sixty-one times a cited case was abrogated by Reed. See, e.g., 
Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 749 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Brown v. Town of 
Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, Ariz., ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015).”); Retfalvi v. United 
States, 335 F. Supp. 3d 791, 796 (E.D.N.C. 2018) (“Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 
708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015).”). In four cases, Reed was only 
used to apply the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Kemp v. Liebel, 229 F. Supp. 3d 828, 
835 (S.D. Ind. 2017). One case quoted Reed in support of a definition. See Mason v. Range 
Resources-Appalachia LLC, 120 F. Supp. 3d 425, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (referring to Reed to 
establish that the phrase “as well as” applies in the several sense). In addition, one case 
was stayed in light of pending resolution of a parallel case. See Meza v. Sirius XM Radio, 
Inc., No. 17-CV-2252-AJB-JMA, 2018 WL 4599718, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018). 
 199 There were eighty-one cases with additional appearances below. Most cases had 1–2 
such appearances. Thomas v. Schroer, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Tennessee, had seven prior rulings. 116 F. Supp. 3d 869, 873–74 (W.D. Tenn. 
2015). This category often intersected with the categories noted in footnotes 173–75 above. 
 200 Eight cases fell in this category. 
 201 This description forms a set of 139 cases. 
 202 Because eight “Signs” category cases applied Reed as straightforward precedent, 
154 cases are examined here to see if they are distinguished (i.e., 162 – 8 = 154). 
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Table 3: Summary of Cases Distinguishing Reed 
Case Subject 
U.S. 
District 
Court 
U.S. 
Courts of 
Appeals 
State 
Appellate 
Court 
State 
High 
Court TOTAL 
Abortion 
Protests 
1 1 0 0 2 
Bankruptcy203 — — — — 2 
Billboards 4 0 2 0 6 
Commercial 
Speech 
8 1 1 0 10 
Picket/Boycott 0 2 0 0 2 
Privacy 2 0 0 0 2 
Regulations204 5 0 0 0 5 
Secondary 
Effects 
3 1 1 0 5 
Signs 4 1 0 0 5 
T.C.P.A.205 0 1 0 0 1 
Other206 2 3 0 0 5 
 
The fact that 29% of the cases analyzed distinguished Reed 
should help assuage fears of broad-brush application. Indeed, it 
appears the concern that “Reed signaled a potentially vast shift 
in the Court’s content-neutrality doctrine, . . . superseding whole 
swaths of doctrine,” has not come to fruition, at least not in 
whole.207 In particular, courts at both state and federal levels did 
not extend Reed to the Commercial Speech category, applying 
instead, and leaving untouched, the commercial speech doctrine 
developed and refined by the courts over the past half-century.208 
The courts also did not attempt to use Reed to overrule the 
secondary effects doctrine, thus declining the opportunity to up-end 
the forty-year-old judiciary treatment of regulations on adult 
entertainment establishments. Instead, relying on unrelated 
precedent, unedited by Reed, the courts allowed governmental 
 
 203 U.S. Bankruptcy Court is separate and distinct from the District and Circuit 
Courts. Rather than exclude the two bankruptcy court cases at the outset, they are 
included here to demonstrate an area of law in which Reed held no sway. 
 204 The Regulations category cases deal with enforcement of a variety of state and municipal 
regulations, such as home-sharing (i.e., Airbnb), professional practice without a license, etc. 
 205 T.C.P.A. is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. This category 
includes “robocall” cases under state statutes as well. 
 206 Other category topics include cell phone radiofrequency emissions, product 
labeling, impersonation, etc. 
 207 Mason, supra note 140, at 956. 
 208 See, e.g., Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 
103 GEO. L.J. 497, 503 (2015). 
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ordinances regulating these businesses to stand as constitutional 
because, despite being content-based on their face, the 
government had a compelling interest in combating any 
undesirable secondary effects from such enterprises.209  
Not all of the topics listed in Table 3 were uniquely 
distinguished by the courts. For example, Billboard and 
Picket/Boycott cases were sometimes subjected to the Reed 
content-neutrality analysis and failed strict scrutiny.210 
Similarly, the categories of Privacy, Regulations, T.C.P.A., and 
Other were sometimes distinguished, sometimes failed strict 
scrutiny, and sometimes passed the same.211 The Signs, 
Billboards, and T.C.P.A. categories will be discussed further in 
the Subject Summaries section below. 
2. Reed Applied 
Again, the relatively high percentage of times the lower 
courts distinguished Reed seems to contradict the predictive 
literature and raises doubts as to the validity of such predictions. 
Further insight can also be gained by examining the results 
obtained by courts when Reed was not distinguished. Consider 
the cases where the Reed content-neutrality analysis was 
applied. Recall from Part II, that this analysis begins with the 
“crucial first step [of] . . . determining whether the law is content 
neutral on its face,”212 and then applies strict scrutiny if the 
inquiry finds the law to be content-based.213 Table 4 summarizes 
the complement of cases distinguishing Reed, i.e., the set of cases 
where Reed was applied. 
 
 209 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 1226. 
 210 See infra Table 5. 
 211 See infra Table 5 & Table 6. 
 212 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (emphasis added).  
 213 Id. (“A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless 
of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward 
the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993))). 
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Table 4: Summary of Cases Applying Reed214 
 
U.S. 
District 
Court 
U.S. 
Courts of 
Appeals 
State 
Appellate 
Court 
State 
High 
Court TOTAL 
Content 
Neutral 
28 11 4 2 45 
Fails Strict 
Scrutiny 
34 8 5 4 51 
Passes Strict 
Scrutiny 
14 3 4 0 21 
 
We see from Table 4 that laws were found to be content-neutral 
about 38% of the time.215 That is, the courts deemed 38% of the laws 
examined in this data set to be content neutral on their face, thus 
passing the initial inquiry posed by a Reed analysis. Perhaps of 
greatest note from this result is the encouragement that it is not 
only possible to write regulations and ordinances in content-neutral 
language, but instances where such language is being debated 
before the courts, it passed the test one-third of the time. This 
outcome does not bolster the predictions of far-reaching effects 
found in the literature, but rather supports an opposite conclusion. 
a. Failed Strict Scrutiny 
For those laws found to be content-based, strict scrutiny was 
applied. In 71% of these strict scrutiny cases, the test was not 
satisfied.216 Table 5 summarizes the topics addressed by cases 
that applied strict scrutiny and found that the regulations failed 
to meet the standard, so that the regulation, law, or ordinance at 
issue was deemed unconstitutional. 
 
 
 
 214 One case declined to give a standard of review and was not included in these 
results. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 215 See supra Table 4. (Calculated as: (number of cases with a content-neutral 
finding) / (total number of cases where Reed was applied) = 45/117 = 38%). 
 216 See supra Table 4. (Calculated as: (number of content-based cases that failed strict 
scrutiny) / (total number of content-based cases) = 51/72 = 71%). 
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Table 5: Summary of Cases that Applied Reed and Failed Strict 
Scrutiny 
Case Subject 
U.S. 
District 
Court 
U.S. 
Courts of 
Appeals 
State 
Appellate 
Court 
State 
High 
Court TOTAL 
Ballot Selfies 1 1 0 0 2 
Billboards 2 0 0 0 2 
Panhandling 8 0 0 2 10 
Picket/Boycott 1 0 0 0 1 
Privacy 5 0 2 0 7 
Regulations 5 0 0 0 5 
Signs 4 3 1 0 8 
Speech217 3 1 1 0 5 
T.C.P.A. 2 2 0 0 4 
Other218 3 1 1 2 7 
 
Again, if a regulation has failed strict scrutiny in this 
analysis, it means (1) the regulation was content-based on its 
face, and (2) either it could not be shown that the legislature 
passed the law to further a compelling governmental interest, or 
the law was not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, or 
both.219 For example, in the two Ballot Selfie cases listed in 
Table 5, laws prohibiting the taking and disclosing of photos of 
completed ballots were not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest because the states failed to show 
a vote-buying problem existed.220  
b. Passed Strict Scrutiny 
When some judges and commentators refer to strict scrutiny 
as “fatal scrutiny,”221 it may be a misnomer. At least, in 
examining the post-Reed cases, we can see from Table 4 that, of 
the seventy-two times the Reed content-neutrality analysis 
passed a case along to be subjected to strict scrutiny, the 
 
 217 The “Speech” category included topics such as false political campaign statements 
and criticisms voiced at school board meetings.  
 218 Other category topics included, for example, conversion therapy, child support 
arrears, doctor-patient communications, etc. 
 219 See Winkler, supra note 52.  
 220 See Ind. Civil Liberties Union Found., Inc. v. Ind. Sec’y of State, 229 F. Supp. 3d 
817, 824–26 (S.D. Ind. 2017); Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 221 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (“‘[S]trict scrutiny’¾scrutiny that 
is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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governmental action satisfied the test 29% of the time.222 Similar 
to instances when courts distinguished Reed, these cases, where 
the application of Reed was not fatal to the regulation in 
question, undermine the literature predictions of sweeping 
changes instigated by Reed, and show that, even applying 
heightened scrutiny, government regulations are constitutional a 
significant portion of the time. The subjects where strict scrutiny 
was satisfied are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Summary of Cases that Applied Reed and Passed Strict 
Scrutiny 
Case Subject 
U.S. 
District 
Court 
U.S. 
Courts of 
Appeals 
State 
Appellate 
Court 
State 
High 
Court TOTAL 
Ballot Selfies 1 0 0 0 1 
Panhandling 1 0 0 0 1 
Privacy 1 1 1 0 3 
Regulations 1 0 0 0 1 
Speech 1 0 0 0 1 
T.C.P.A. 7 1 0 0 8 
Other223 2 1 3 0 6 
 
For example, in contrast to the Ballot Selfie cases that failed 
strict scrutiny, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York determined a similar New York election law passed 
strict scrutiny.224 The court found the State had a compelling 
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process, and the 
law was narrowly tailored to prevent vote buying, voter 
intimidation, and voter coercion.225 A comparison of additional 
cases separated by subject is given in the next section. 
3. Subject Summaries 
Topics which the courts have generally treated inconsistently 
warrant further study. For these subjects, the court findings 
appear at odds, sometimes distinguishing cases from Reed and 
sometimes applying Reed’s standard. Table 7 combines the 
information from the tables above for an easy comparison of the 
 
 222 See supra Table 4. (Calculated as: (number of content-based cases that passed 
strict scrutiny) / (total number of content-based cases) = 21/72 = 29%). 
 223 Other category topics included, for example, intimidation of a flight crew, juvenile 
probation terms, etc. 
 224 See Silberberg v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 272 F. Supp. 3d 454, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 225 See id. 
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previous results, arranged by subject. Table 7 is rich with 
information that could be further analyzed; however, this 
Comment provides particular focus on Sign, Billboard, and 
T.C.P.A. cases. 
Table 7: Inconsistent Topic Treatment 
 Distinguished 
Passed Strict 
Scrutiny 
Failed Strict 
Scrutiny 
Ballot Selfies 0 1 2 
Billboards226 6 0 2 
Panhandling227 0 1 10 
Picket/Boycott 2 0 1 
Privacy228 2 3 7 
Regulations229 5 1 5 
Signs 5 0 8 
Speech230 0 1 5 
T.C.P.A. 1 8 4 
Other231 5 6 7 
 
Given the subject matter of Reed itself, the Billboards and 
Signs categories are interesting to consider. These two categories 
were originally differentiated because sign ordinances were 
limited to individual municipalities, whereas regulations 
governing billboards tended to be county or state ordinances. 
Both categories apply Reed in the same manner. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, none of the facts of the billboard or sign cases were 
found to support a compelling government interest accomplished 
in a narrowly tailored manner; i.e., none passed strict scrutiny. 
The courts’ analyses in these cases were, for the most part, a 
 
 226 Compare GEFT Outdoor LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 187 F. Supp. 3d 
1002, 1004, 1016–17 (S.D. Ind. 2016), with Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A., 245 
Cal. App. 4th 610, 613, 624–25 (2016). 
 227 Compare Gbalazeh v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 3:18-CV-0076-N, 2019 WL 1569345, 
*1–2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2019), with Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656, 659, 666 
(E.D. La. 2017). 
 228 Compare Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1170–72 
(N.D. Ill. 2018), with In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110, 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 229 As previously mentioned, the Regulations category cases deal with enforcement of 
a variety of state and municipal regulations, such as home-sharing (i.e., Airbnb), 
professional practice without a license, as well as business permits, animal rights, etc. 
 230 The “Speech” category included such topics as false political campaign statements 
and protests during the presidential inaugural parade. 
 231 The “Other” category includes all previously mentioned “Other” categories 
including, but not limited to: cell phone radiofrequency emissions, conversion therapy, 
intimidation of a flight crew, juvenile probation terms, child support arrears, etc. 
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straightforward application of Reed and its reasoning.232 Of the 
case holdings that distinguished Reed, all found the content at 
issue to be commercial in nature, and, in line with the results 
presented above, deigned to extend Reed to commercial speech.233  
The T.C.P.A. cases also present an interesting distribution: one 
was distinguished, eight passed strict scrutiny, and four failed strict 
scrutiny. The distinguished case found a Minnesota T.C.P.A. 
extension statute to be based on phone receivers’ consent, 
differentiating it from statutes delineating content restrictions.234 
Five cases addressing state robocall statutes, also attempting to 
expand the T.C.P.A., passed strict scrutiny twice and failed three 
times. These state robocall cases were found unconstitutional 
twice because the court recognized residential privacy as only a 
substantial interest, not a compelling state interest.235 In the 
remaining case, Cahaly v. Larosa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the statute was overinclusive and 
not narrowly tailored.236 Interestingly, of the seven cases 
addressing the T.C.P.A. directly,237 all had been found to satisfy 
strict scrutiny under the Reed application until the Fourth 
Circuit found the debt-collection exemption failed as 
underinclusive and ordered it severed from the T.C.P.A. 
regulations.238 It appears robocall and T.C.P.A. legislation has 
yet to be fully refined. 
Looking at these categories of cases helps us understand 
Reed’s true impact. For cases on-point dealing with the same 
subjects and similar fact patterns to those found in the initial 
Reed dispute, the lower courts applied Reed and obtained similar 
results. When Reed was applied to different facts and types of 
regulations, however, the particular facts of each case controlled 
if and how Reed would impact the finding. This is not surprising. 
Although predictive literature seemed to view Reed as an excuse 
the courts would use to strike down regulations across the board, 
Reed has inversely percolated in a seemingly straightforward 
manner, wherein the lower courts appear to have exercised 
reasonable restraint instead of rubberstamping broad swathes of 
governmental regulation unconstitutional as was feared. 
 
 232 See, e.g., Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, VA., 811 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 233 See, e.g., Contest Promotions, LLC v. City of S.F., 874 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 234 Gresham v. Swanson, 866 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 235 See, e.g., Gresham v. Rutledge, 198 F. Supp. 3d 965, 970 (E.D. Ark. 2016). 
 236 796 F.3d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 237 See Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants v. Sessions, 323 F. Supp. 3d 737, 744 
(E.D.N.C. 2018), vacated and remanded, Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. 
Commc'ns Comm'n, 923 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 238 See Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 923 F.3d at 167.  
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D. Conclusions from the Data 
Has “Reed ushered in . . . a dramatic shift in the way courts 
employ content neutrality as a core principle of the First 
Amendment”?239 Is “Justice Thomas’s formulation of the 
content-neutrality test . . . a radical shift in doctrine”?240 Has 
Reed “render[ed] the Supreme Court’s commercial speech 
jurisprudence moot”?241 
These questions, reflecting the general post-Reed fears, can be 
answered in the negative. Reed has had repercussions on subjects 
like sign ordinances, but the lower courts have not extended Reed 
to topics such as the commercial speech doctrine or the secondary 
effects doctrine. That is, the lower courts have resisted the 
potential to upend First Amendment doctrine by imposing a 
uniform application of strict scrutiny across the board.  
Furthermore, the Reed decision itself may have resulted in 
behavioral changes among potential parties, thereby keeping 
some cases from being filed or from reaching the population of 
cases examined herein. For example, if a sign code interpretation 
arose on-point for a Reed analysis and the ruling seemed 
predestined, there is little chance that the case would have made 
it through the legal system far enough to fall within the orbit of 
cases considered here. Additionally, it is likely that many 
municipalities revisited their sign and city codes after Reed—or 
upon threat of lawsuits based on Reed—and redrafted their codes 
where possible to preempt parallel attacks, thereby keeping the 
number of on-point cases filed since Reed to a minimum. Thus, 
the narrow application of Reed by the lower courts has most 
likely contributed to the reduction in the number of these types 
of cases over time. 
VI. WHEN SHOULD RIPPLES BE EXAMINED? 
Examination of the Reed impact shows that many of the 
fears hypothesized in predictive literature failed to materialize. 
The lower courts did not wield Reed to hack away at First 
Amendment jurisprudence, nor did they use Reed as an excuse to 
cast broad application of strict scrutiny across a wide variety of 
legal matters. For Reed in general, predictions did not become 
reality. By observing the divergence of Reed’s actual impacts and 
those predicted in the literature, we can see that the lower courts 
have “best protect[ed] core First Amendment values . . . by 
 
 239 Haupt, supra note 127, at 150. 
 240 Lauriello, supra note 149, at 1132. 
 241 Daniel D. Bracciano, Commercial Speech Doctrine and Virginia’s ‘Thirsty 
Thursday’ Ban, 27 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 207, 228 (2017). 
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refusing to let the content-based tail wag the First Amendment 
dog.”242 Specifically, the inverse percolation of Reed has remained 
tame compared to the envisioned far-reaching effects that have 
not come to fruition. 
This evidenced disparity between predictions and reality 
relating to the Reed case raises the question of when such an 
analysis should be done on other Supreme Court opinions. 
Clearly such a study is useful, whether the inverse percolation 
results parallel and validate the forecasts, or diverge from the 
predicted effects. But the degree to which hypotheses and 
realities are out of phase may not be evident until sufficient time 
has passed for the incongruity to be recognizable. I assert that 
four or more years is an acceptable amount of time for the 
inverse percolation of a case through the lower courts into 
general jurisprudence to produce statistically significant results, 
and, thus, for a richer understanding of the true repercussions 
originating from a Supreme Court opinion to be obtained. Failure 
to allocate sufficient time for this process may introduce a risk of 
misleading conclusions about the impacts of individual Supreme 
Court decisions, as well as a risk that uncertain predictions of a 
decision’s impact may be accepted as accurate.  
A robust impact analysis of the results of inverse 
percolation, as described herein, is useful for evaluating the 
true place a particular Supreme Court decision holds in 
American jurisprudence. Conducting a reflective study on a 
decision by reviewing the actual manner in which the lower 
courts have applied a Supreme Court holding after a few years 
allows for a broader understanding of the decision in general. 
The analysis also enables the researcher to compare such 
application to the corresponding predictive literature, and 
confirm or correct any impact prophecies. Thus, this type of 
impact analysis reflects a more evidence-based way of 
narrowing in on a decision’s true significance, and its utility 
counsels others on the informational benefits available from 
undertaking similar studies to revisit prior impact predictions 
via an evidence-based analysis of actual effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 242 Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 
1982 (2016). 
